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Poland: Changes in Church-State Relations Ahead?

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An Intelligence Assessment

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*EUR 87-10020
May 1987*

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An Intelligence Assessment

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This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of European Analysis, with contributions by [redacted]
[redacted] Office of Soviet Analysis, and [redacted]
[redacted] EURA. [redacted]

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**Poland: Changes in Church-State
Relations Ahead?**

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Key Judgments*Information available
as of 15 May 1987
was used in this report.*

The prospect for an agreement that would legalize the Catholic Church's status in Poland has increased considerably. At a Vatican meeting in January between the Pope and General Jaruzelski, both leaders agreed to pursue more cooperative relations and to seriously explore possibilities for an accord and an exchange of ambassadors.

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Signature of an accord would have important near- and long-term implications for Communist rule in Poland and for Polish political developments. By signing, the regime would rescind its ideological claim to rule alone and would burden itself with a moral commitment to satisfy the Church's view of acceptable behavior, with new penalties to pay if it did not. In return for ensuring the Church's help to maintain stability, both Warsaw and Moscow would openly consent to tolerate a more independent and assertive Church and to accept a further loss of the party's prestige and its authority to govern unaided. The Church, moreover, would have every interest in expanding further whatever new stature and role it obtained.

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An accord would bring gains for the regime and the Church. The regime would hope to achieve:

- Additional legitimacy at home and abroad.
- Church advice to society urging calm and cooperation with the regime, as the latter pursues economic renewal including economic austerity.
- Isolation of the radical opposition through Church endorsement of its declared moderate and gradual approach to reform.

The Church would:

- Gain valuable legal protection for its strong de facto status, particularly security for its tax and property rights and educational mission.
- Enhance its status as Poland's leading moral authority and independent institution as it seeks to minimize the effects of stagnation in Poland such as family breakdown, alcoholism, and youth alienation.

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An accord still faces major obstacles, however.

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Jaruzelski is most likely encountering strong opposition from party members averse to, in their view, the dangerous precedent of officially recognizing and thereby further strengthening a powerful potential adversary.

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Even without an accord, however, Church-state relations are likely to improve, at least in the short-to-mid-term.

- Jaruzelski needs the Church to promote stability as he tackles Poland's economic and social woes.
- He wants formal relations with the Vatican to boost his standing in the West as he pursues credits and debt relief.
- Many Church leaders who see Solidarity on the decline believe the Church must work within the system to keep pressure on the regime to experiment with reform.
- Both the Pope and Cardinal Glemp believe Jaruzelski is sufficiently flexible to accept pragmatic, productive Church-state ties.

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If the Church and state develop a more cooperative relationship, the opposition and other dissident groups will have to adjust to a more assertive Church seeking workable compromises with the regime. If the Church believes strongly that the regime is seriously pursuing reform—a judgment it has probably not yet made—it will most likely press moderate oppositionists to cooperate, or at least to remain neutral, to give the regime's reforms a chance.

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Gorbachev's pragmatic and flexible politics have apparently led both Jaruzelski and Church officials to believe Moscow will adopt a hands-off policy on the issue, at least within limits. Gorbachev realizes Jaruzelski needs domestic stability and is anxious to see economic renewal in Poland. Furthermore, an accord would play well in Western Europe as an example of the Gorbachevian "enlightened socialism," which is tolerant and flexible in meeting new challenges. However, neither Gorbachev nor Jaruzelski would equate legalization of the Church with power sharing with nonparty forces and would insist that the Church operate within the limits of single party rule.

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Better Church-state relations, and an accord if it is reached, would benefit US interests.

- Pressure would mount on the United States to accept the regime and to grant economic concessions, but the Church would gain maneuvering room for the opposition and encourage regime moderation.
- As the arbiter of the regime's reform progress, the Church would be in a strong position to bring heavy pressure on the regime to respect human rights, open a dialogue with the populace, and bring nonparty people into government.
- In signing an accord, the regime would sanction a major Church role in Polish affairs, both current and future, in calm and crisis, in some ways predictable but, in other ways not, which would be costly to withdraw.

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Poland: Changes in Church-State Relations Ahead?

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A Troubled Past

Polish Church-state relations have alternated in the postwar era between implacable hostility and limited cooperation. The key variable has been the extent of the government's need for either the Church's tacit or its open support to guarantee domestic stability. Periods of crisis in 1956, 1970, and 1980-81 saw significant Church gains as the government sought a "partnership of necessity" with the Church.

The late Cardinal Wyszynski and Cardinal Glemp successfully manipulated swings in regime policy to acquire benefits such as: permission to build new churches; rights to conduct religious education; and inclusion of Church facilities and chaplains in major state enterprises, hospitals, and the army. The government, when it became stronger, has always attempted to retrieve what it had surrendered in its weakness, but these efforts have been only partially successful.

The Church has never secured legal guarantees for its de facto status because the regime, backed by Moscow, has been fearful of granting juridical stature to an adversary so independent and powerful as the Catholic Church. Moreover, the government has often sought to undercut the Polish Catholic Church by dealing directly with "outside" Church authorities in the Vatican. Because the interests of the Polish Church and the Vatican have not always been identical, Polish authorities have tried to play the Polish Episcopate against the Vatican. This tactic has been ineffective with the current Polish Pope, who is well aware of the government's game.

Growing Regime-Church Dialogue

the public record suggest that the major players—the regime, the Polish Church, and the Vatican—believe it is now worthwhile to explore again the possibility for an historic agreement granting the Church legal status. The issue, along

with the broader question of more cooperative Church-state relations in Poland, was reportedly discussed candidly in a series of meetings between General Jaruzelski, the Pope, and Vatican and Polish Church officials in January of this year.

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At the least, the meeting between Jaruzelski and the Pope, which John Paul II labeled historic, laid the groundwork for a substantial easing of Church-state tensions.

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Recently, both regime and Church spokesmen have publicly stated that negotiations on a diplomatic exchange between Warsaw and the Vatican are well advanced, implying that progress is also occurring on the legal status negotiations, which is linked to a diplomatic exchange. At the same time, official regime publications have emphasized that on many issues—peace, environment, anti-alcoholism, national rebirth—the Church and state share common interests, perhaps preparing the public for more profound Church-state cooperation.

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Status of The Roman Catholic Church in Poland

The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is unique in Eastern Europe. It is the most powerful nongovernmental institution in Poland. Of a total population of 37.7 million Poles, 34.5 million are Roman Catholic, with 75 percent practicing their religion regularly, and some observers claim that a majority of party members are believers. [redacted]

The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is organized into seven archdioceses, 21 dioceses, and 8,040 parishes. Its hierarchy includes five cardinals; three archbishops; 81 bishops; 20,311 priests; 7,517 seminarians; 1,334 brothers; and 24,850 sisters. This hierarchy operates over 10,000 churches; more than 30 seminaries; the Catholic University of Lublin; and the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw. Poland has the highest annual percentage increase in the number of priests among European countries and in 1985, accounted for 30 percent of all newly ordained priests on the continent. [redacted]

Poland alone among the Warsaw Pact nation allows the Church to teach religion in state schools. As recently as September 1986, religious knowledge in

schools was also introduced in most secondary schools, some vocational schools, and technical secondary schools. The Church also publishes over 90 periodicals and newspapers. [redacted]

In addition to spiritual and educational tasks, the Church has assumed a number of social and charitable responsibilities that include special services for workers, farmers, and artists. The Church's rural pastoral communities have become influential self-aid organizations for farmers. The Church's support of independent artists and intellectuals has resulted in a massive influx into the Church of people of all intellectual casts. After the declaration of martial law in December 1981, the Church provided meeting places for supporters of the banned Solidarity trade union; aided families of political prisoners; and supplied artistic outlets for writers, actors, and musicians who boycotted the government-run media. It condemned martial law; demanded reinstatement of the Solidarity agreements; and appealed for the release of imprisoned Solidarity leaders. [redacted]


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While the details of an agreement remain shrouded, the Church's educational prerogatives and its guaranteed access to the media and communications probably figure prominently in the talks. The regime recently legalized an influential underground newspaper published by a prominent Catholic lay editor, and a Church spokesman commented on easing press censorship, perhaps showing the regime's earnestness on the latter issue. The regime may also make concessions to the Church on access to building materials, its tax exempt status, and its right to collect, control, and disburse charitable funds. [REDACTED]

While working on a draft accord, the Polish Church, the regime, and the Vatican have at the same time worked relatively smoothly together to create an atmosphere emphasizing national pride and social calm for the Papal visit in June. Negotiations on the visit between the Church and state also have proceeded well, demonstrating the utility of practical, business-like relations, which some churchmen have cited as a model for an era of improved relations after the visit. [REDACTED]

Perspective on Accord

An agreement between the Church and state in Poland on legal status would be a major development and would be preceded by a complex calculation of risks and benefits by each party, as well as by Moscow. Each side would try to pay the smallest price possible. If an agreement were reached, each would then attempt to manipulate it to its advantage. Solidarity and the opposition would be directly affected by an agreement that pledged the Church—the protector of the opposition—to seek with the regime a middle ground in Polish politics. [REDACTED]

The Regime. Jaruzelski's apparent willingness to seriously consider granting the Church legal status paradoxically exhibits both the regime's failure to gain the popular support it needs to govern and Jaruzelski's growing personal stature, which may allow him—now that Solidarity is contained—to gamble on working more closely with the Church. He apparently views the Church as a relatively predictable, "safe" institution that enjoys tremendous prestige and is committed to finding practical solutions rather than to open confrontation. Moreover, in ruling out any dealings with Solidarity, Jaruzelski made the Church his only potential partner. [REDACTED]

Through better relations with the Church, the regime hopes to gain :

- Additional legitimacy at home and abroad and increased prospects for domestic stability.

- The isolation of Solidarity's radical elements through Church efforts to convince respected Catholic activists and some in the moderate opposition to work with the government.
- Church acceptance of responsibility for pushing reform—for example, by openly endorsing and participating in the Social Consultative Council or, failing that, at least by using its powerful voice to caution patience and understanding on behalf of the government's intended and painful economic reforms, including austerity measures.
- An improved prospect for establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The regime probably calculates that diplomatic relations would bolster its standing in the West, thereby enhancing its prospects for credits and economic ties.

The regime would run significant risks by granting the Church legal status. Hardliners in the party, who already view Jaruzelski and his military contingent with distaste, would see him as too eager to placate the Church and would suspect his Marxist credentials. Both the previous Minister of Religious Affairs and his recent replacement are known hardliners who are probably resisting the accord.

To maintain the Church's conditional support for his regime, Jaruzelski would also have to satisfy Church expectations for gradual political and economic reform. Though he may be willing to placate the Church on its religious and some of its educational objectives, he would face stiff opposition on meeting its political objectives if they did not coincide with those of the regime. Such dependence would only further enhance the Church's role as the monitor of

the regime's progress and would reinforce its position as the only respected mediator between the regime and the populace. Thus, in order to strengthen his regime, Jaruzelski must, paradoxically, further strengthen the Church. This would make the task of "rolling back" the Church in the future all the more difficult. Moreover, a Church with legal status might feel less vulnerable and less inclined to "toe the line," and a Church able to monitor and approve the regime's political performance could, in fact, demand a kind of de facto power sharing in return for helping to stabilize Poland. A future government would be particularly vulnerable to such pressure in periods of crisis.

The general may also face skepticism, if not outright hostility, from the other East European regimes if he signs an accord with the Church.

Jaruzelski will feel pressure to show how, by signing an agreement, his regime gained more than it gave. Consideration for this "demonstration effect" could toughen the general's bargaining stance.

The Church. Most Church leaders in Poland want legal status as a bulwark for maintaining the Church's central position in Polish society. While some powerful voices have cautioned that the government would use any agreement to hem in the Church, proagreement leaders probably calculate that legal status would:

- Confer the security of de jure recognition on the Church's hard-won de facto status and allow churchmen to deal directly with government ministries on issues of interest.
- Provide a more predictable legal framework for settling chronically difficult problems such as the Church's role in private school education and its property rights.
- Reinforce the Church's status as Poland's leading moral and independent political force as it seeks to

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influence both the faithful and the government to work together in solving Poland's problems.

The Church, too, runs risks by appearing overly cooperative with Jaruzelski and by accepting legal status. The faithful, as Cardinal Glemp has noted, will not follow a collaborationist Church hierarchy. The Church thus crosses thin ice in trying to bridge the gap between the regime and the populace, and it risks failing to satisfy the expectations of both.

If an agreement is reached, Church leaders will try to avoid collaborationist charges by reassuring the faithful of their reform sympathies, and some in the Church hierarchy may push the regime to carry out promised reforms more aggressively than the regime had anticipated. This could put the Church on a collision course with the regime, which expects the Church to moderate the opposition's reform demands. As in the past, the Church will also try to deflect regime attempts to involve it directly in some reforms, lest it be blamed if it fails or be tainted for making a cynical compromise with the regime.

Proagreement forces in the hierarchy also risk alienating the younger members of the lower clergy who tend to reflect the public activism of the Solidarity era—exemplified in the extreme by the murdered Father Popieluszko—and who are less prone to cooperate with the authorities. Thus Glemp could face a leadership challenge in his own Church if he appears too eager to deal with the government, although, in such a highly disciplined organization, Glemp's views would prevail. Others in the Church will seriously doubt the wisdom of compromising now, when the Church is growing stronger at the expense of the regime.

The Church also faces the danger that, even if granted legal status, a more hostile future regime could undermine its value by a restrictive interpretation.

The Opposition. Though not a party to any formal agreements or tacit understandings between Church and state, the secular political opposition will be affected by the outcome. The Church continues to provide safehaven for opposition activities and material aid for opposition members and their families, although the level of support and the Church's tolerance for the more radical opposition varies with bishop and location. Despite its obvious proreform sympathies, however, the Church by no means endorses the entire political agenda of the opposition and has often criticized the radicals for their unrealistic reform expectations. For example:

- While the Church supports trade union pluralism, it has called for unions to be nonpolitical and to respect the realities and practical limits of their larger political settings, apparently a veiled warning of Poland's need to reform within limits acceptable to Moscow. This self-inhibiting injunction means that the Polish Church tends to stigmatize as too disruptive many "direct action" tactics such as strikes and lockouts often used by trade unions in the industrial West.
- The Church has called on the government to permit the formation of Catholic artisan and professional associations in local dioceses, suggesting a preference for traditionally more docile Catholic unions and civic associations closely adhering to Church social doctrine over secular trade unions associated with Solidarity.
- While the Church endorses greater scope for private enterprise and capital, it has called for private economic interests to be morally responsive to the common good. This communal outlook tends to restrain the free play of competitive market forces advocated by some in the secular opposition.

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- Although the Church strongly supports the rights and dignity of individuals, it—like the regime—above all abhors anarchy. Cardinal Glemp has hinted that Poland is not yet ready for some aspects of Western democracy with its emphasis on competitive, potentially divisive, interest group politics, thus suggesting his willingness to restrain political experimentation that may prove too disruptive.
- The Church publicly stresses the moral rather than the political reform of society and, with its perspective across the centuries, will accept a slower pace of political reform than the secular opposition prefers.

In the role of “honest broker” between the regime and the populace, the Church may also become more selective in its support for the opposition.

With or without an agreement on legal status, the opposition will most likely have to adjust to a more politically active Church, even if much of this activity involves “cloakroom” mediation between moderate regime forces and Church-endorsed nonparty elements. Moderates, such as Walesa, may have to defer increasingly to Church interpretations of Polish political developments and may feel pressure to subordinate their reform agendas to the Church's. If the Church believes strongly that the regime is seriously pursuing reform—a judgment it has probably not yet made—it will most likely press moderate oppositionists to cooperate, or at least to remain neutral, to give the regime's reforms a chance. Should the Church more vigorously pursue its own programs, it could precipitate a rancorous split in the opposition by those unwilling to yield to the Church.

For the time being the Church will most likely maintain its pressure on the government to adopt political and economic reforms as its condition for bringing the believers and the regime closer together, thereby creating maneuvering room for the opposition. The Church has put Jaruzelski on notice that it expects stronger efforts to decentralize the economy, develop mechanisms for a freer exchange of ideas with nonparty elements, and respect individual legal rights. While many in the Church still doubt the regime's sincerity, the government's recent promotion of Aleksander Legatowicz, an independent Catholic layman well regarded in Poland and the Vatican, to the Council of State probably reflects the kind of movement the Church will accept as a sign of regime earnestness and as a token that the Church can point to in advising the moderate opposition to give the regime the benefit of the doubt.

Selling an Accord to Moscow. Both Jaruzelski and Soviet party leader Gorbachev recognize that a legal accord with the Polish Church would set a precedent with implications for Soviet-style “socialism” and the primacy of atheistic party rule. In proceeding with negotiations, Jaruzelski believes he has a conditional green light from Moscow based on Gorbachev's pragmatism and his desire to see Poland become a stable, economically self-sufficient member of the Soviet Bloc.

Jaruzelski will put any accord he reaches with the Church in the best possible light when reporting to Moscow. We believe that he will:

- Stress the better image in the West and domestically of modern socialism in accepting the place of the Church in society and will emphasize the dominant position of the regime in granting the Church such status.
- Note that the Church in Poland has proved itself a predictable force, which in several past crises has come to the rescue of the regime by counseling social calm; and that, in any case, the regime cannot gain the social peace needed to renew Polish socialism without a constructive Church-state relationship.

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- Argue that the Church, compared with the opposition, is willing to work within the system rather than try to overthrow it. He may remind Gorbachev that the Church itself is not a democratic organization and that its traditional values of discipline, obedience, and communal outlook make it a reliable institution with which to deal.
- Note that, while a legal accord probably cannot be annulled, a renewed party at some time in the future could still hope to take the initiative from the Church and narrowly interpret the accord.
- Tell Gorbachev that the Church in Poland is uniquely strong and, therefore, the concessions it receives in Poland would not be necessary elsewhere in Eastern Europe, let alone in the Soviet Union.

Jaruzelski will also point out the value of the Church's de facto endorsement of the current government, which he will probably claim the signing of an accord signifies. The Church will have accepted, in this view, the sovereignty of a socialist state—an important precedent given the bitterly anti-Communist crusades of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s.

The View From Moscow. Gorbachev's speeches

indicate that he is seriously concerned over the ongoing upsurge in religiosity in the USSR and is therefore likely to give careful consideration to Jaruzelski's attempt at accommodation with the Catholic Church. We judge that the Kremlin views the renewed vitality of Christianity in the Soviet Union with deep concern, perceiving that religious values present a serious ideological challenge to its own legitimacy. The leadership also probably sees the election of a Slavic pope as encouraging Roman Catholic activism in the USSR and as intensifying the potential political threat of nationalism in such borderland areas as the Baltic republics and the Ukraine.

Gorbachev's views will be further influenced by disagreements that we judge exist in leadership circles over the extent to which a Communist system should accommodate the persistent pressure—and even growth—of believers and religious organizations within an atheistic state, and how much modification of

expression toward them can be safely allowed. There are some signs that other prominent Soviet leaders, such as Yegor Ligachev, take a harsher approach toward these questions than does Gorbachev.¹

the public record indicate that the Soviet leadership does not fully understand the differences between the role the Polish Church plays and the role that various churches in the Soviet Union play. This lack of understanding, compounded by Gorbachev's evident lack of intention of making any domestic revisions of law or administration that are of a systematic nature, might prevent Gorbachev from appreciating the need for such a change in Poland.

Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union and his approach to Eastern Europe suggest that the Soviets would see a number of gains from an accord. They would:

- See an accord as a tangible example of the normalization of the situation in Poland. Gorbachev could point to it as an example of his seriousness in promoting a democratization of the Communist system, and—within overall guidelines set by the Soviet Union—granting freedom of maneuver for the East Europeans.
- Believe an accord could enable the Polish regime to include law-abiding religious believers within the bounds of the loyal citizenry of a socialist state, while isolating and discrediting religious activists who challenge the Communist system itself. Gorbachev has been making this distinction in the Soviet Union.
- Expect that accommodation between the state and the Church in Poland could lead to a greater stability in the country, which might result in

¹ Ligachev's speeches about religion are usually more combative; he recently implicitly equated religious belief with subversion of the Soviet state. He has underscored the regime's concern over the volatile connection between faith and nationalism by specifically attacking the reactionary clerical elements of the Islamic, Uniate, and Roman Catholic religions, which have strong constituencies in Central Asia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania.

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improved Polish economic performance at a time when the USSR wants greater economic support from the East Europeans for the modernization of the Soviet economy. []

On the negative side, Gorbachev will have to consider the following:

- The size and influence of the Polish Catholic Church make accommodations with it more risky than any similar accord in another East European country or in the Soviet Union itself. On the other hand, in his recent Prague speech, Gorbachev seemed willing to let the East Europeans seek their own domestic accommodations on their paths to socialism.
- The accord, even if subsequently not adhered to, would be a precedent for Church-state relations elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the USSR. In addition, it could fuel religious and nationalistic ferment in the western Soviet Union.
- The accord might give the Church a greater and "legal" role in the upbringing of youth and in providing alternative moral guidance to the populace. Gorbachev has repeatedly called for more sophisticated atheistic propaganda in order to better counter the appeal of religion, and does not appear to have any tolerance for such a church role in a socialist state.
- One of the basic levels of Marxist-Leninist thinking is the undisputed leadership of the Communist Party. Thus any real power sharing with another entity within a socialist state would not be enthusiastically embraced by Gorbachev and the Politburo. []

In evaluating the acceptability of a revision of the Church's role in Poland, Gorbachev might be caught in a highly ambivalent situation, as he appears to be when dealing with the churches at home. In our judgment, he is content to stand on the sidelines for the present and leave his options open. Moscow's endorsement of church legalization would depend on Jaruzelski's ability to persuade Gorbachev that the accord would ultimately be more profitable for the

Polish regime than for the Church and that it would not necessarily signal unacceptable liberalization. Since the initiative in Poland—and the more tentative ones in the Soviet Union at accommodation with the churches—would probably attract conservative opposition, both Gorbachev and Jaruzelski would have to monitor closely Church-state relations in order to make the requisite adjustments to their policy. A serious domestic backlash or excessive demands from the Polish Church would force them to make a tactical retreat. []

Outlook and Implications

As the issues of Church legalization and diplomatic exchange have moved to the forefront of the Church-state agenda, strong arguments for and against the measures have emerged. Decades of mistrust, moreover, have left open questions on each side about what each could expect from the other after signing an accord. Nonetheless, the Church and state have informally recognized each other and have profitably exploited their complex and ambivalent relations. Moreover, new considerations have emerged that have significantly improved prospects for an accord:

- Regime efforts to gain popular support have failed, and it is now desperately trying to overcome Poland's economic and social stagnation.
- The Church finds itself in a particularly strong position vis-a-vis the regime and the weakened opposition in its efforts to extract concessions.
- Approval or benign detachment seem probable in the Vatican and Moscow. []

A highly successful Papal visit in June could generate the good will and political determination to push chances for an accord—which were virtually nonexistent only last year—to perhaps slightly better than even by early summer. []

[] while the Church and the state are discussing a range of issues, the experience of working out simpler matters such as the Papal visit could create the necessary trust to tackle the thornier problem of the normalization of the Church's status. However, if the talks are still occurring in late summer, after the good will of the Papal visit has

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dissipated, Church officials will come to believe the regime is once again stalling and doubt the regime's willingness to push through enabling legislation. []

[] some senior Church officials already suspect the regime of playing such a game. []

Implications of An Agreement. Juridical recognition of the Church would reflect the regime's acknowledgement of growing social pluralism in Poland, would be unprecedented in the Bloc, and would signal a significant evolution in the East European totalitarian experience. Both Warsaw and Moscow would thereby openly consent to tolerate a more independent and assertive Church, with further loss of the party's prestige and its authority to govern unaided in return for ensuring the Church's help to maintain stability. []

By granting the Church legal status, Jaruzelski could considerably burnish his image as a reformer and a nationalist. He would benefit at home from an upsurge of favorable Church commentary praising his daring step. However, any improvement in his personal standing would probably not automatically redound to the benefit of the party or to the Communist system of rule. Rather, he would need to translate his popularity—perhaps with encouragement from the West—into a movement to create a genuine dialogue within society to achieve the full benefits of legalization. His willingness to do so is questionable, however, because he does not equate legalization with power sharing. Yet he will have to make sufficient concessions—perhaps adopting as his own some opposition policies—to convince the Church that he struck a bargain in good faith. []

Abroad, the regime would aggressively seek to exploit its image of toleration and innovativeness that would follow the signing of an accord to persuade Western governments to grant Poland new credits and debt relief. The regime would trumpet the accord as proof of Poland's irreversible commitment to renewal and would claim that Western economic aid would help guarantee the necessary social stability to fully carry out political reforms. []

Jaruzelski would also use his prestige in the West to point to Poland as an example of Gorbachev's vision of enlightened socialism reforming itself to meet the

challenges of the next century. He would also capitalize on his favorable image to push Soviet arms control and peace initiatives, particularly in the Catholic countries of Western Europe. []

Some in the Vatican would make a strong case that the time had come, following the Polish model, to normalize the Catholic Church's status elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Jaruzelski would hope to allay concerns about the implications of an accord by pointing to the Church's unique role in Polish history and by noting that his accommodation was part of Poland's national road to socialism. The Church's position elsewhere in Eastern Europe is not as strong as in Poland and prospects for formal accords and diplomatic relations are more problematic. Nevertheless, several Bloc countries might welcome full diplomatic relations with the Vatican—for the same reason as Poland—to enhance their images in the West in hopes of economic and political gain. None, though, would be likely to grant their domestic churches any of the privileges that the Polish Church enjoys, nor would they relinquish rights to approve episcopal selection, pay clerical salaries, or control educational and media access. Thus, hard bargaining would lie ahead before the Polish model could bear fruit. []

An accord would dramatically move the Church into the forefront of political discussions with the regime and might result in an apparent decrease in the role of the opposition. The Church might even proscribe some radicals as outside the political pale. Though the Church has a key role to play in both stabilizing and changing Poland, we expect the opposition to remain strong and diverse. The Church might not entirely reflect such diversity, but it remains a source of alternate policy proposals and protests that reflect the aspirations of millions of Poles. []

We believe more cooperative Church-state relations, especially if they culminate in an accord, would benefit Western and US interests. Pressure would probably increase on the United States to accept the regime, or at least grant it the benefit of the doubt, and to give more economic support. However, the

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Church would be better able to keep pressure on the regime to experiment with reform and to avoid stagnation. It may not expect the government to share power, but it probably hopes that Jaruzelski, taking his cue from Gorbachev, would open more government positions to nonparty "men of talent"—especially lay Catholics. Such men may ultimately bring new thinking and more moderate policies. In the long run this should create more maneuvering room for both the Church and the secular opposition. From the regime's point of view, Church mediation could also help break the dangerous pattern of sullen unrest, leading to crisis and crackdown so dangerous to overall East-West relations. A more powerful Church, meanwhile, could also restrain the hand of repression in periods of crisis and force compromise rather than confrontation. []

With or without an accord, the West can expect that the Church will try to unite a badly fractured society. It will use its moral influence to urge all parties to develop a sense of shared responsibility for Poland's fate, justifying sacrifices on that part of the population and willingness to experiment with new policies on the part of the regime. This could create a more moderate and tolerant society in the heart of Eastern Europe that is more congenial to Western values and is an example to its neighbors of a more pluralistic and open socialist state. []

Implications of No Agreement. The effects of a breakdown of negotiations would primarily depend on how the talks failed. Negotiations that broke down quietly, with minimal recrimination, and left in their wake agreement on a considerable number of details of an accord would not adversely affect the prospect for an enduring period of eased relations. After some initial disappointment, both sides would most likely see a residue of practical benefits deriving from the intense negotiations, justifying limited cooperation in some areas and a truce in others. The Church already has done well on matters dear to it:

- Jaruzelski acceded to all the Pope's requests for the coming visit.
- The Church has apparently had better access to the media in the past few months.

- Open channels of dialogue have been durable enough to reportedly survive even sharp differences of opinion between the Church and the regime. []

Moreover, the state has once again taken up the Church's call for moral rebirth, openly joining and, in some cases, commending it in campaigns against crime, high divorce rates, alcoholism, pollution, and the arms race. []

The state, for its part, has benefited from:

- The Church's mild criticism of its economic policies—particularly the March price hikes.
- Its cautious endorsement of some political reforms.
- Harsh words by the Church for some in the more radical political opposition.
- Conditional public approval of Jaruzelski. []

Thus the Church and the state might tacitly agree to continue the current era of better feelings despite the fate of legalization. We would then expect the two to work behind the scenes, using established channels to emphasize areas of mutual interest and to contain the potentially disruptive conflicts that will continue to separate them. []

We believe that any return to deeply hostile Church-state relations would more likely be the result of a drastic change in the regime's domestic policy than in any failure of present talks on legalization. The Church has clearly put Jaruzelski on notice that his regime must respect individual rights and civil liberties. Many churchmen view the regime's tolerance for much of the ostensibly illegal underground activity in Poland as a bellwether of the regime's willingness to permit a more pluralistic Poland to emerge. []

The circumspection of both sides, as the negotiations on legal status have proceeded, suggests an effort to avoid any bitter, open breakdown of the talks. In any event, such a breakdown almost certainly would not occur before the Papal visit or in its immediate aftermath. However, if this does occur, and particularly if it were accompanied by mutual cynical evaluations of the other party's sincerity, it would revive more tense Church-state relations:

- An acrimonious break would strengthen the hand of anti-Church party members and antiregime clerics.

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- Both Jaruzelski and Glemp would be forced to disavow their declared optimism that they could work together constructively to solve Poland's problems, although both leaders probably would leave the mudslinging to their subordinates.
- Most, if not all, formal and informal Church-state contacts would be temporarily suspended. The Church would no longer balance its criticism of the regime with cautious praise for reform initiatives, and the state would step up its anti-Church, anti-clerical propaganda; harass the Church on tax and educational issues; and probably curb the Church press.

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In such a scenario, both sides would suffer from the mutual goring; but the regime, which more desperately needs the Church than the reverse, probably would make quiet overtures for a more practical *modus vivendi* after a decent interval.

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